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LAWYERS AND RULES: SOME ANGLOAMERICAN COMPARISONS
Sixth Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture*
by
Patrick S. Atiyah **

NE frequently hears the observation that the United States is the
most law-ridden country in the world. Law and lawyers play a far
more important and pervasive role in American political and social life than they do anywhere else. It has often been remarked that almost any kind of controversy or dispute in the United States will
ultimately end up in the courts. I do not dispute the truth of any of these
facts, and yet I believe that any serious comparison of British and American law and society will show that there is a sense in which Britain is a
much more rule-governed, as opposed to law- or court-governed, country
than the United States. In this lecture, I shall first offer some general evidence in support of my belief that Britain is a more rule-governed country
than America; and second, I shall inquire into the reasons for these
differences.
Although a number of different factors are clearly relevant to the question of how extensively a society can be said to be rule-governed, I shall
concentrate in this lecture on one set of factors in particular, namely those
that relate to the courts. I shall begin by considering the extent to which
courts and judges perceive themselves to be bound by rules, the extent to
which they do in fact follow rules, and the extent of the institutional and
other pressures on them to follow rules, including in particular the degree
of control or regulation of those who seriously deviate from the rules.
I.

A.

COURTS

Courts of Last Resort

There is only one court of last resort in England; in the United States
* This paper was presented at Southern Methodist University School of Law on
March 29, 1983. A fuller version of the lecture will eventually be incorporated in a collaborative work on which the author is engaged, together with Professor R.S. Summers of Cornell Law School.
** Professor of English Law, St. John's College, Oxford; Visiting Professor, Harvard
Law School, 1982-83.
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there are many, and the courts of the two countries have different traditions in various respects. Such evidence as is available suggests that, taken
as a whole, there is probably little-perhaps surprisingly little--difference
in the perceptions of the judicial role by English and American judges in
courts of last resort. In both countries it seems likely that most such judges
see their primary rule as one of loyalty to the law, and to rules, while
acknowledging a secondary but more active role. This secondary role may
be seen as one of keeping the law up to date, or of interstitial legislation, or
of simply being a lawmaker. In both countries different judges place varying degrees of emphasis on the relative importance of the two roles, and
some judges in both countries undoubtedly feel anxiety over the legitimacy
of the second role. In England, the House of Lords usually includes some
judges who see their role as being primarily that of law-interpreters or lawdeclarers and others who see a greater scope for judicial activism; sometimes one group seems more dominant, and sometimes another. In
America, the United States Supreme Court almost invariably contains a
similar mix of conservatives or strict constructionists and liberals or activists. State supreme courts appear more likely to have a particular tradition
of conservatism or activism. Thus, one recent study of state supreme court
judges found that four out of seven members of the New Jersey court saw
their primary role as that of lawmaker while six members of the Louisiana
court perceived themselves primarily as adjudicators and none as a
lawmaker.'
Notwithstanding this appearance of transatlantic uniformity of views, I
suggest that any study of observable behavior by courts of last resort will
present a rather different picture. So also, the functions that are today
thrust upon the courts in the two countries differ in very significant ways,
and these differences tend to make United States courts of last resort less
rule-governed than the English House of Lords. I will discuss a number of
issues that appear to me both to demonstrate and to explain, at least in
part, why this should be so.
I start with the fact that, compared with most United States courts, English courts are much less adventurous in law-making, that they are more
wedded to stare decisis, and that they tend to favor a more literal approach
to statutory interpretation. I believe at least one important reason for these
differences is that English judges do generally believe that law is a system
of rules, and act on that belief to a greater degree than most American
judges, particularly in courts of last resort. No doubt the differences are of
degree, but in some respects these differences are very substantial. Two
types of judicial behavior seem to me particularly relevant in this respect;
first, the reversal of prior settled doctrine, and second, the prevalence of
dissent.
1. H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS 34-35 (1971). For a similar study,
with not strikingly different results, of the judges of three federal circuit courts, see J. HowARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(1981).
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Stare Decisis and Judicial Activism. Since the issuance of the "Practice
Statement" of 19662 the House of Lords has reserved the right to overrule
its own decisions. Thus the formal position on stare decisis is the same in
England and in all United States courts of last resort. But the practical
position still differs very significantly. The House of Lords has several
times insisted that the power to overrule its own decisions is to be exercised
sparingly, and must usually be justified either on the ground of a significant change in conditions, or on the ground that the previous decision was
anomalous or contrary to principles in analogous fields. The House of
Lords has insisted on one other point also: mere change of mind, whether
personnel, is
on the part of individual law lords, or by reason of changing
3
not itself a ground for reopening a previous decision.
It is scarcely necessary to say that the practice of the House of Lords in
this respect differs markedly from that of most courts of last resort in the
United States. Both in the United States Supreme Court and in many state
supreme courts, prior decisions of the court itself are not generally treated
as sufficient in themselves to prevent a reopening of the questions of law
there decided. Naturally, those judges who agree with the prior decision
will invoke the doctrine of stare decisis, but those judges who disagree with
it often appear to feel quite free to vote to overturn it. There are, of course,
variations in the traditions of the state supreme courts. Stare decisis quite
clearly means more in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts than it
does in the Supreme Court of California, but overall there can be no doubt
that courts of last resort feel free to, and do, overturn their own decisions
at a rate that would profoundly shock English lawyers if it happened in
England.
There are no doubt many reasons for this difference and indeed many
different kinds of reasons-some psychological, some sociological, some
institutional. One reason seems to me to be that English judges are more
inclined than American judges to think of the law as a set of rules, to think
of judicial decisions as enunciating those rules, and to see themselves as
subject to the rules in the same way as everybody else. A judge's duty, an
English judge would say, is primarily to apply the law, and previous judicial decisions in the courts of last resort are the law. The judge does, of
course, have a secondary, lawmaking function where there are no prior
decisions, but these gaps in the law are relatively few and far between.
Only in quite exceptional circumstances, therefore, should the judge's secondary, law-making function be permitted to operate where a clear prior
decision already determines the rules. These perceptions of law, rules, and
gaps in the system are, of course, open to philosophical challenge, but few
observers of the English legal scene would dispute that they are held by an
overwhelming number of judges, and indeed by most practicing lawyers
too. Conversely, equally few observers of the American legal scene would
2. [1966] I W.L.R. 1234.

3. See generally Paterson, Lord Reid's UnnoticedLegacy-A Jurisprudence of Overrul-

ing, I OXFORD

J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (1981).
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doubt that, though similar perceptions are widely found in American
courts, alternative perceptions also may be found. I would hypothesize
that many American judges regard rules as having less importance than do
English judges; that they see judicial decisions as illustrations of underlying principles (often seen as drawn from morality or natural law) rather
than as rules in themselves and of themselves; that they see the law-making function of courts of last resort as more important than English judges
do; and that they do not in consequence feel bound by prior decisions to
the same degree as English judges.
One significant explanation of these facts springs from the different constitutional position of courts of last resort in the two countries. There are
many important political issues on which the judges have the last word in
the United States but not in England. To be sure, it is rare for a judicial
decision to be retrospectively overturned by the British Parliament-even
the supreme and omnicompetent British Parliament--though it is far from
unknown. But much more important is the fact that any House of Lords
decision with seriously controversial political implications is open to subsequent modification or reversal by Parliament. Moreover, this is no mere
ritual phrase in the British political system. It is a reflection of political
reality. A decision with serious political implications will inevitably be
studied by the Government, and if the Government does not like it, pro4
posals to modify or reverse it will be laid before Parliament and passed.
The position in the United States differs from that in Britain not merely
in relation to constitutional decision-making. Ordinary United States judicial decisions are much more difficult to overturn by legislation even where
the legislature has the competence to do so. Many of the reasons for this
are well known. American executive governments do not control legislatures; party lines are much less strongly observed in practice; legislative
procedures often give disproportionate influence to committees and chairmen of committees; and so on.
The result of all this is that courts of last resort in the United States
know that their decisions are likely to be long-lasting and difficult to reverse even when they are not immune to reversal for constitutional reasons. Those factors lend some plausibility to a central assumption on
which a certain amount of American political science research has been
based. 5 This assumption holds that judges decide cases in accordance with
their personal value systems and predilections, and that the reasons for
their decisions contained in their opinions are merely rationalizations that
do not actually propel the judges to their conclusions.
This kind of research and the assumptions on which it is based are antipathetic to traditional legal scholarship both in America and in England,
but far more so in England. Indeed, it is scarcely possible to conceive of
4. For example, the decision in Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129 (limiting immunity

of trade unions to actions in tort), was overturned by the Trade Disputes Act, 1965, ch. 48.
5. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL
MIND REVISITED (1974).

1983]

LAWYERS AND RULES

such research being conducted or taken seriously in England. It seems to
me plausible to suppose that one reason for this is that, given the relationship between courts of last resort and legislatures in the two countries,
English judges are more likely than American judges to feel (and act) as
though they are bound by rules, and less free to achieve a result they personally favor. A second plausible reason for supposing that many American judges may be more willing to decide cases, within limits I do not
doubt, in accordance with their personal value systems is that both their
function and their personal backgrounds tend to be far more overtly political than those of their English counterparts. Almost by definition politicians tend to be either goal-oriented people or power-ambitious people.
Such people are more likely to decide questions of law in legal disputes
because they want to produce certain results in the legal system or in society at large. Judges who see their role as more professional and less political, and who have no political background (like most modern English
judges), may be less likely to decide cases in accordance with their own
private beliefs and desires.
Another set of institutional factors may also help to explain some of the
reasons for the lower level of judicial activism in England, although it is
sometimes difficult to disentangle cause from effect in these matters. English appellate judges, as compared with American appellate judges, rely far
more heavily on the arguments of counsel, and far less heavily on their
own researches, in deciding questions of law. In part this is forced on English judges by the lack of any research assistance and even of adequate
secretarial assistance. English judges have no clerks able to do research for
them; if they want to research a problem they have to do it themselves.
Moreover, little time is available for such research, at least given the traditional English view that decisions ought to be handed down as soon as
possible. In the English Court of Appeal, which is the final appellate court
for the vast majority of cases, most appeals are still decided on the conclusion of the oral
argument, and ex tempore oral opinions are delivered
6
immediately.
It seems clear that these traditions also encourage the judge to see himself in the role of passive arbitrator whose business it is to decide which of
the rival contentions offered to him by opposing counsel is the better.
These traditions naturally discourage judges from setting off on voyages of
discovery of their own, rejecting the views of both parties and fashioning
their own decree to match some private vision of the public good. Indeed
many English judges regard it as improper for a judge to rely on precedents or arguments that have not been canvassed by counsel; the proper
course for a judge who believes counsel have overlooked important cases
or arguments is to relist the case for a further hearing.
Prevalence of Dissent. Despite the difficulties of comparison, dissent appears to play a much more important role in the American than the Eng6. D. KARLEN,

APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND

98 (1963).
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lish judicial scene. In the United States Supreme Court dissent has greatly
increased over the years. In the 1930s, for example, the number of
nonunanimous decisions was often less than 20% each year while in the
1950s it was common for more than 70% of full opinions to attract some
dissent. 7 In the 1980 term 68.8% of full opinions attracted dissent and even
28.4% of8 memorandum orders did so. Fully one quarter of all votes were
dissents.
Because the House of Lords hears so few cases, comparisons with dissent rates in that court may not be very meaningful. In fact, dissent rates,
in percentage terms, have varied over the last fifty years from 10% to as
high as 46%. 9 These percentage rates are not low, indeed they are higher
than those in many state supreme courts, but the absolute number of dissenting opinions is very low indeed, rarely more than ten in a year, and for
present purposes this may well be the more significant factor.
In American state supreme courts dissent rates vary quite widely. In
1966, for instance, the highest rate was 46.5% (in Michigan) and the lowest
was 1.2% (in Massachusetts).' 0 Although the position of each state has
varied over the years, the overall average has not changed much. In some
states the supreme courts are racked by repeated dissents, and the judges
may fall into clearly identifiable blocs, often closely correlated with their
political affiliations. In other states a more socializing role is played by the
court as an institutional whole, and such factionalism is unknown. Because so few cases are heard by the House of Lords it is worth adding a
few comparisons between the intermediate federal appeals courts and the
English Court of Appeal. Amongst federal circuit courts differing dissent
rates have been noted, varying from 15.5% to 2.8% in 1961 through 196411
and from 13.2% to 1.4% between 1965 and 1971.12 During this latter period five circuits averaged dissent rates of 7.4% or more.' 3 It is not easy to
compute such precise figures for the English Court of Appeal, but I have
attempted to analyze the cases heard by that court in 1980, and this shows
a total for the year of approximately 540 cases in only six of which there
was a dissent, a rate of just over 1%.14
One final comparision may be of some interest. Lord Denning, who
recently retired from the bench after what is believed to be a record tenure
of thirty-six years, had a well-deserved reputation for idiosyncratic views
7. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court. 4 History ofJudicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q.

186, 203-09 (1959).

8. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 339-41 (1981).
9. Percentages calculated from figures drawn from the English Law Reports for 1916,
1941, 1966, and 1980.
10. H. GLICK & K. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 79 (1973).
11. Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals, 1961-1964, 60
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 374, 377 (1966).

12. See J. HOWARD, supra note 1, at 193.
13. Id.
14. I obtained this figure by taking the number of reported Court of Appeal decisions in
the Law Reports for 1980 and adding to them the unreported cases noted in the Current Law
Yearbook 1981 (which relates to 1980).
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that led him to dissent far more frequently than most English judges. Yet
out of a total of 1742 cases in appellate courts in which he participated,
Lord Denning dissented in only eighty-three, a dissent rate of 4.7%. 15 By
comparison, Justice William 0. Douglas, who was in some ways a comparable figure who also sat on the bench for thirty-six years, dissented in
1321 cases out of a total number of 6863, a dissent rate of 19.2%.16
I next draw attention to an even more striking contrast between patterns
of judicial behavior in the courts of the two countries. In England a dissenting judge in the House of Lords regards the decision of the majority as
creating binding law; the decision settles the applicable rule and even the
dissenter is bound by that rule in future cases. All English judges, with the
exception of Lord Denning who, especially in his later years, never really
accepted the doctrine of stare decisis at all, respect this tradition.
A particularly striking example of judicial adherence to this practice can
be found in the behavior of Lord Reid in two famous cases on the criminal
law, Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions 17 and Knuller (Publishing,
Printing & Promotions) Ltd v.Director of Public Prosecutions. 18 In Shaw
the House of Lords held that the common law recognized the extremely
vague offense of "conspiracy to corrupt public morals."' 9 Lord Reid delivered a spirited dissenting opinion on classic civil libertarian grounds.
His dissent was widely approved by commentators, few of whom had a
good word to say for the majority decision, which in any case seemed out
of touch with the new sexual permissiveness of the sixties. After the issuance of the 1966 Practice Statement in which the House of Lords asserted
the right to overrule their own decisions, Knuller, a similar case, was again
taken on appeal. As Lord Reid was again sitting, there were confident
hopes that Shaw would be overruled. In fact, the House of Lords, with
Lord Reid in the majority, refused to do this; the 1966 Practice Statement
was never intended, Lord Reid asserted, to enable decisions of this kind to
be overturned by the House of Lords. Therefore, even though he himself
continued to believe Shaw was wrong, he voted to follow it.
As is well known, judicial behavior of this kind is not the norm in American courts. From the Supreme Court of the United States to the lower
courts, dissenting judges usually behave as if they feel free to repeat their
dissents over and over again, and the moment the composition of a court
changes a previously dissenting judge will seek to convert his dissent into
the majority opinion. Although examples of the English practice are not
appear sufficiently noteworthy to
unknown in United States courts, they
20
occur.
do
they
when
comment
attract
What is the relevance to my theme of varying dissent rates and practices? One possibility is that such practices simply reflect the greater ho15. Figures obtained from LEXIS.
16. Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.

1962 A.C. 220.
1973 A.C. 435.
1962 A.C. at 266, 287, 291.
H. GLICK, supra note 1, at 81.
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mogeneity of English society and English judges on the one hand, and the
greater diversity of peoples and values that exist in the United States on
the other. Hence, it may be said in the United States there is more scope
for reasonable disagreement among reasonable persons in deciding what
the law is. This may well be part of the story, but I do not think it is the
whole story. It seems evident to me that the differing prevalence and function of dissents in the United States and English courts is in part a reflection of differences in the judges' perceptions of the nature of the judicial
role and indeed the nature of law itself. Perhaps these differences can be
identified on two separate planes.
First, judges who are more concerned to impress the public with the idea
that law in some sense represents neutral and eternal values of truth and
right may be more concerned to present a united front, and suppress their
differences of opinion. Hence the infrequency of dissent in a particular
jurisdiction may reflect "acceptance of the notion that unanimity denotes
precision and truth and, therefore, is more convincing."' 2 1 I think English
judges are more influenced than most American judges by a desire to promote this goal. By contrast, American judges often appear to have viewed
dissent as a way of asserting "a personal, or individual responsibility...
of a higher order than the institutional' '22responsibility owed by each to the
Court, or by the Court to the public.
Second, as I have already suggested, judges who perceive the law as a
system of rules binding on the judges as on everyone else are more likely to
arrive at the same conclusion in a given case. For to put it at the lowest
level, such a view of the nature of law and the judicial rule narrows the
range of choice open to the judge and therefore makes unanimity more
likely. This also appears to me to reflect a major distinction between English and American judges, speaking in general terms.
B. Intermediate Courts
I turn now to consider some of the more striking differences between the
practices and functions of lower courts in the two countries, focusing in
particular on distinctions that may throw light on the degree of rule orientation in the two countries. The English court structure is more centralized
and more hierarchical than the American. In England lower courts are
expected to-and do--conform without question to the rulings of higher
courts. An English lawyer would probably regard this as so much a matter
of course that he would be surprised at any inquiry into it. No explanations would be called for; it is simply a part of the system, accepted by all.
If we are to venture any explanations, it seems to me clear that there are
basically two reasons for the absence of any deviations from the accepted
theory. First, judges and lawyers are socialized by their traditions to ac21. Id. at 3.

22. ZoBell, supra note 7, at 203.
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cept this aspect of the system, and secondly, any sign of aberrant behavior
by lower courts or judges is quickly dealt with by higher courts.
In a small centralized legal system like England's the higher courts can
without difficulty correct all instances of deviant behavior brought to their
attention, and given a small, and also very centralized, legal profession, it
is highly unlikely that serious instances of deviant behavior would not be
rapidly appealed and overturned. The fact that the publicity media are
national in their coverage also contributes in some measure to the
strengthening of these traditions. For example, when a judge took the
highly unusual course of putting a convicted rapist on probation in 1982,
the case was widely reported and commented on in the national press. No
appeal is possible by the prosecuting authorities in such a case, but very
shortly afterwards the Court of Appeal, hearing appeals in a number of
other rape cases, took the opportunity to make a public pronouncement
about the type of sentence it regarded as appropriate for that offense. 23
With minor judicial offenders such as magistrates seriously aberrant behavior would almost certainly be widely reported and in all probability
would lead fairly rapidly to removal from post by the Lord Chancellor. So
far as the higher judiciary are concerned, other factors also encourage loyalty to the system that I shall consider later.
I have said that all judges and lawyers in England accept the traditions
of loyalty to higher court rulings, but I must admit that Lord Denning was
an exception to this generalization as he was to so many others about the
English judiciary. He does, however, provide us with an excellent illustration of what happens in the rare case when English judges throw over the
traces. In Cassell& Co. Ltd v. Broome 24 a jury had awarded the plaintiff
£25,000 punitive damages (in addition to £15,000 compensatory damages)
in a libel action. Only a few years earlier, however, the House of Lords
had in Rookes v. Barnard25 severely limited the circumstances in which
punitive damages were to be recoverable in tort. In fact all the judges who
heard Cassell& Co. Ltd v. Broome ultimately agreed that punitive damages were properly awardable on the facts of this case in accordance with
the ruling in Rookes, but when the case reached the Court of Appeal Lord
Denning encouraged counsel to argue that Rookes was wrongly decided
per incuriam on the question of punitive damages. Counsel accepted the
invitation, and Lord Denning succeeded in persuading his two colleagues
that Rookes had been decided per incuriam and should not be followed,
and in addition, that trial judges should be instructed not to follow Rookes
in the future.26 In the English legal system this was little short of rank
mutiny, and retribution followed, swiftly and inevitably. An unusually
23. Regina v. Roberts, 74 Crim. App. 242, 244 (1982). In fact there is no reference in
the opinion in this case to the widespread publicity attracted by the earlier unreported case,
but nobody in England at the time could have doubted the influence of the one event on the
other.
24.
25.

1972 A.C. 1027.
1964 A.C. 1129.

26. 11971] 2 Q.B. 354, 384.
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large panel of seven law lords was convened to hear the appeal in Cassell&
Co. Ltd v. Broome, and a solemn magisterial rebuke was administered to
Lord Denning for this conduct, which was said to raise constitutional issues. 27 While Lord Denning himself was able to shrug off this rebuke-he
was already the longest serving judge on the bench-it is safe to say that
no other English judge will run the risk of such treatment from an appellate court.
The position in the United States differs from that in England in many
ways and for many reasons. First, the federal system means that there is
no simple hierarchical structure of courts throughout the country. Even
within a single state the number and complexity of the relationships between the different courts is often such that "the actual operation of most
state judicial systems does not make state judges part of a well-regulated,
'
cohesive hierarchy. "28
The sheer size of the country, and even the quantity of litigation and the
number of lower courts in a particular state, may make it impossible for
higher courts adequately to control deviant lower court behavior. For example, in California alone in 1979 there were 65,000 contested dispositions
in state superior courts, 5750 in courts of appeal, and 123 in the supreme
court. 29 One commentator has noted of the situation in California:
In theory, whenever a trial or intermediate appellate court departs
from the law as announced by the highest court, the decision can and
should be reversed through the process of appeal. In fact, appellate
review is an inefficient system for correcting error. Misapplications of
law can be shielded from review, deliberately or otherwise, in any
number of ways, and the sheer volume of cases makes it unrealistic to
suppose that a supreme court itself, even with the willing aid of the
intermediate appellate courts, can reach any significant percentage
of
30
what litigants think are possible mistakes by the trial courts.
If this is the position even within a single state, the problems of federal
control of aberrant state judicial behavior are obviously far worse. For
one thing, the more political nature of the American judicial role means
that judges, especially state judges, often have a political constituency to
consider, and their loyalties to this political constituency sometimes outweigh their loyalties to the judicial hierarchy and even the constitutional
supremacy of federal court decisions. The problem may be aggravated by
the parochialism of much of the media, which means that local court decisions may receive little publicity outside the immediate locality.
In certain areas of the law, notably the desegregation and religious establishment cases, some state courts have waged a hard fought campaign
against decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Although very few
state judges have ever openly declared their refusal to implement Supreme
27. 1972 A.C. 1027, 1053. It will, of course, be appreciated that in England a "constitutional" issue means nothing more than an issue of major political importance.
28. H. GLICK & K. VINES, supra note 10, at 33.
29. P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES 408 n.* (1981).
30. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
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Court decisions or abide by the terms of the Constitution, there has often
been a long history of delay, evasion, and prevarication. Sometimes the
line between evasion and outright defiance of Supreme Court rulings has
undoubtedly been crossed despite judicial assertions to the contrary. One
study of the impact of United States Supreme Court decisions on the religious establishment issue, for instance, identified fifteen clear cases of state
supreme court noncompliance with United States Supreme Court rulings,
out of a total of ninety-seven cases on this issue decided by the state
supreme courts between 1967 and 1973. 3 1 Another study suggests that the
initial reception by the Florida Supreme Court of the Gideon, Escobeda,
and Miranda decisions was hesitant, "narrow," and "suspicious" and indeed in some cases seems to have gone well32beyond a reluctant and "begrudging acceptance" to downright evasion.
The United States Supreme Court simply cannot exercise adequate and
effective supervision over the judicial system of the entire country. When
widespread evasion of Supreme Court rulings takes place at lower levels of
the judicial system there is absolutely no guarantee that a litigant, even if
he has the time and money, can ultimately obtain a decision in accordance
with those rulings. To an English lawyer, used to the strictly hierarchical
structure of the English court system, such results are unthinkable, but the
American judicial system does not fit a hierarchical model in the same way
as the English system. There is also some evidence that lower state courts
are on occasion even more prone than state supreme courts to pursue their
own way, heedless of rulings of higher courts that are clearly binding upon
them according to the accepted constitutional position. The reason for this
appears to be that the further down the judicial hierarchy one goes, the
more political is the function of the judge, and the less insulated he is from
the local political constituency.
C

Trial Courts and the Judicial Process

Much of what I have said concerning appellate courts applies also to
trial courts. There is no question that English trial judges are, for many of
the above questions, more rule-governed than American trial judges; but,
in addition, the continued use of the civil jury in America makes the
American trial a totally different exercise from the English trial. Trial by
judge is just not the same thing as trial by jury. Judges give reasons for
their decisions, juries do not; judges cannot openly discard or flout the law,
juries can; judges at least attempt to put aside prejudice and emotion, juries often do not. Nobody can doubt that jury trial is a less rule-governed
and less predictable mode of trial than judge trial.
The contrast can be seen vividly by comparing a typical personal injury
trial in English and American courts today. Although minor variations in
doctrine exist, the substantive rules of tort law do not differ a great deal in
31. See G. TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS 35-55 (1977).
32. Note, Gideon, Escobeda, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance of The United States
Supreme Court's Mandates In Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 350-51 (1969).
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the two countries. Far and away more important than any differences in
the law are the differences in the mode of trial and all that flows from those
differences. In particular, an English judge today makes a serious attempt
to itemize the different elements in an award of damages in a personal
injury case and to justify each item separately. Thus, judge awards of
damages in England are far more predictable and also far lower than jury
33
awards in America.
II.

THE JUDGES

So far I have been speaking of the courts as institutions. But courts are
staffed with judges-men and women of particular qualifications, backgrounds, and characteristics. The way they decide cases in courts is affected by the kind of people they are, the socializing experiences they have
had, and the conditions under which they hold office. I suggest that the
differences in the character of the judiciary are again significant factors in
producing a more highly rule-oriented English than American legal
system.
Perhaps the most important difference between the judiciary of the two
countries is one of the least observed, namely their relative size. The English judiciary is tiny by comparison with the American judiciary. The
higher judiciary (High Court judges and above) comprises the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls, eleven lords of appeal,
eighteen lord justices of appeal, the Vice-Chancellor, President of the
Family Division, and eighty other judges of the High Court, a total of 114.
The next tier of the system comprises the circuit judges who try criminal
cases in the Crown Courts and civil cases in the County Courts. There are
some 350 circuit judges. These are the only people who are properly called
34
judges in the English legal system.
Not only is the number extremely small, but the judiciary is also a very
centralized body. All important appellate work is done in London, and
most High Court civil litigation is also conducted in London. Thus, all the
higher judiciary are based in London, although some of the High Court
judges are required to travel to other cities to hear criminal cases in the
Crown Courts.
By contrast, the American judiciary is enormous. The federal judiciary
comprises the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 180 justices of thirteen circuits and 893 district judges all of whom rank, in terms
of jurisdiction and power, with English High Court judges. 35 In the states
the total number of judges exceeds 8000 although many of these may have
a limited jurisdiction and powers similar, or less, than those of an English
33. For an account of the method of assessing damages in personal injury cases in England, see P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW ch. 7 (3d ed. 1980).
34. See Megarry, Barristers and Judges in England Today, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 387,
388 (1982).
35. Except for bankruptcy judges, whose present status is a matter of constitutional uncertainty as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982).
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circuit judge.36 Many of the larger states have a three-tiered judicial system like England's. In these systems, however, the number of judges
greatly outnumbers those in England. California alone, for instance, has
694 judges, although the population of England greatly exceeds that of
37
California.
In addition, of course, American judges operate in a far less centralized
system. Not only does each state have its own judicial system within its
own borders, but even the federal system is decentralized and the states
also have permanent courts in major cities. These factors naturally militate against homogeneity.
There are also many well known differences between the laws governing
the qualifications, modes of appointment, and tenure of the judiciary in
the two countries. All the higher judges in England have to be qualified
barristers of at least ten years standing. This is a statutory requirement. 38
But it is today also a firm convention that nobody is appointed as a judge
who has not had many years of active professional practice at the bar.
Thus, the statutory requirement of ten years standing would not in practice
be regarded as satisfied by someone who had not been in active practice
for at least that length of time; in fact, few judges are appointed who have
not been active barristers for at least twenty to twenty-five years. No law
professor has, as such, ever been appointed to the English bench.
Until comparatively recent times-perhaps the Second World War
marks the turning point-previous political service was a valuable assistance to securing judicial appointment. Indeed, until the early years of this
century it was rare for the highest posts, Lord Chief Justice and Master of
the Rolls, to be offered to someone who had not been active in politics on
the side of the government making the appointment. But for the past
thirty years or so this has no longer been the case. Fewer and fewer politicians now make the transition to the bench, except of course for the highly
anomalous post of Lord Chancellor that violates all the rules by combining
a high political and a high judicial office, and even those who do, it is now
safe to say, are appointed on professional merit. Nominally all judges are
appointed by the Queen, but the power to recommend appointment of
higher judges lies, by statute, in the hands of the Prime Minister (in the
case of appellate judges) and the Lord Chancellor (in the case of trial
judges). Although appellate judges are not required by statute to have
some experience as trial judges, it is today quite exceptional for anyone to
be appointed to an appellate court straight from the bar. It would be unusual for a trial judge to be appointed to the House of Lords unless he has
served some years in the Court of Appeal. Since the Act of Settlement of
1701 all of the higher judges are, of course, irremovable except on an
36. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK
1983, at 254-55 (1982) [hereinafter cited as BOOK OF THE STATES].
37. Id.

38. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 10(3)(c).

OF THE STATES,
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address by both Houses of Parliament, though there is now a compulsory
retiring age of seventy-five.
In all these respects, of course, the situation differs fundamentally in the
United States. First, the formal qualifications needed for appointment to
the bench, so far as professional legal experience goes, are minimal. There
are no constitutional or statutory qualification requirements for federal judicial appointments other than that district judges must be residents of the
district to which they are appointed. About half the state constitutions
have some modest requirement as to the minimum number of years of
legal practice a person must have before appointment. Many states merely
require judges to be learned in the law, and even the ABA Model Judiciary Act of 1962 only calls for the requirement that a judicial appointee be
"licensed to practice law in the courts of the state. ' ' 39 Further, all judicial
appointments in the United States are treated as political, and public or
political service in some shape or form is far more important as a qualification for getting on the bench than the extent of professional experience.
Some recent attempts to depoliticize the appointing processes of state justices have perhaps been more successful in improving the quality of the
40
judiciary than in depoliticizing it.
Formally, methods of appointment vary widely. Federal judges are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation. State judges are
appointed in a variety of different ways, commonly classified in five main
groups: appointment by the governor (11 states), by the legislature (4), by
nonpartisan election (10), by partisan election (12), and under some variant of the so-called Missouri plan (13).41 But there are many variations
within these classes; for example, in some states, judges are appointed in
the first instance by the governor, but may have to seek electoral confirmation after a certain length of time. In addition, formal powers of appointment are significantly affected by political custom or convention; for
example, federal district judges are usually appointed on the nomination
of the governing party's senator, if any. In fact, many state judges who are
in theory supposed to be elected are in the first instance appointed by a
governor to an often carefully engineered vacancy and only subsequently
to electoral confirmation, with the advanrequired to submit themselves 42
tage then of being incumbents.
Finally, the position as to tenure also varies widely. Federal judges enjoy the same life tenure as English judges (without the compulsory retiring
age), but few state judges enjoy life tenure. Many must seek reelection or
reappointment after terms that vary from six to fourteen years for most
39. MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 5, 2 (1962).
40. Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure of
Judges, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 51, 55-56 (G. Winters
ed. 1967).
41. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 36, at 260-61.
42. Winters, One Man Judicial Selection, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 120, 120-21 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
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supreme court judges, but can be as short as four years for some state trial
judges.
The conventions governing appointments differ from those followed in
England almost as much as do the strict legal rules. For instance, United
States appellate judges frequently have no prior judicial experience at all,
and sometimes have very little trial experience even as lawyers. Such prior
experience is not even thought to be very important by most American
lawyers although the ABA, which has now acquired some influence in federal judicial selection, does regard prior trial experience as an important
requirement for a trial judge. 43 Academics are not infrequently appointed
to federal and state judicial posts, even where they have little or no experience as practising lawyers. 44 In some cases there is no doubt that political
considerations lead to appointments of judges of low competence whose
legal knowledge and training are inadequate by any professional standard.
Even in the case of federal appointments, where higher standards generally prevail, a number of judges have been appointed over the protests of
the ABA, which had45rated them "not qualified" according to its own evaluation and criteria.
Other important differences exist between the conventions governing the
judiciary in the two countries. In England the position of High Court
judge, or above, is regarded as the apex of a professional career, and as the
end of any other career. Nobody with political ambitions would become a
High Court judge in England; and almost nobody resigns from such a position in order to return to a political, or indeed any other, career. Instances of deviation from these traditions are rare indeed. In the United
States, of course, judges can and do move from the bench back to politics,
and sometimes to very aggressive and partisan politics. Even United
States Supreme Court Justices have done this, 46 and many state judges do
not regard their positions as lifetime jobs, indeed, lack of tenure often
precludes such a view of their appointment.
One cannot exaggerate the importance of these differences between the
qualification, modes of appointment, and tenure of the judges in the two
countries. They have a profound influence on the law in a great many
ways. In particular, I suggest that they play an important role in making
the English judiciary more rule-oriented than the American judiciary.
Consider first the position of an English barrister who aspires to become
a judge. He much catch the eye of one person above all others: *the Lord
Chancellor's; and he must impress two groups of persons with his professional skills: the existing judges and, to a lesser extent, his professional
colleagues. The views of the political parties, the media, and the public are
43. J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 111-13, 138-39 (1965).
44. Some of America's most distinguished judges have been former professors, both in
federal courts (e.g., Felix Frankfurter in the United States Supreme Court) and state courts
(e.g., Roger Traynor in the California Supreme Court).
45. J. GROSSMAN, supra note 43, at 47-48.
46. For example, Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the Supreme Court in 1916 to
run for President.
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of almost no consequence at all. Consider next the position of an English
judge of the High Court. He has "arrived"; he holds office for life; he has
social status and prestige. But most such judges would like to be promoted
to an appellate court. The work tends to be more interesting, the pressure
less, and there is no obligation to travel to other cities because all appellate
work is done in London. How does a judge get promoted? Again, by impressing his colleagues and senior judges with his professional skills. Even
when a judge is appointed to the House of Lords, his principal motivations
probably derive from a desire to impress his colleagues and the judges in
courts below. He has, anyhow, absolutely no need to curry support or
favor with anyone else.
Given, then, this intense professionalization of the judicial role in England, it is not surprising that judges should be very rule-minded people,
wedded to stare decisis, and strongly of the opinion that significant change
in the law should be left to Parliament and the politicians. Lower court
judges are unlikely to be candidates for promotion to appellate courts if
they display deviant tendencies to reject or disregard appellate court precedents, just as barristers are unlikely to be candidates for appointment to
judicial office if they have given any indication that they reject conventional ideas of stare decisis or embrace radical views of the judicial role.
Appellate court judges, at least in the House of Lords, are, it is true, free
from such constraints, but the conventional requirement for prior experience as a trial judge means that few judges reach the House of Lords
before the age of sixty. By that time an English judge will have been exposed to upwards of thirty-five years of socializing pressure in the conventions of the judicial role. At such an age, the temptations of radicalism are
apt to wane. Over several centuries only one judge, Lord Denning, can be
said to have succumbed to them.
Compare now the position in the United States. A person who wishes to
become a judge may have to court, and join, a political party; he may, if he
seeks elective state office, need to attract public attention. Furthermore,
because judicial office is itself more political and is often a further stepping
stone to other political posts, more politically minded people are attracted
to judicial office. On the other side of the coin, the leaders of the legal
profession are often less attracted to judicial posts. By American standards, judges are not particularly well paid, and in the case of the state
judiciary, the lack of life tenure may be a significant disincentive to more
professional, or nonpolitical, lawyers.
Even after appointment to a judicial post, these factors may continue to
influence behavior. A judge who sees the judicial post as a stepping stone
to more openly political offices may need to maintain a high public profile.
That is more likely to be achieved by doing, and saying, unusual things,
rather than by being a safe, traditional minded judge, who adheres to stare
decisis and settled doctrine. Even for those who see a judicial post as a
lifetime career, there are pressures that may lead an American judge to
adopt a more adventurous role than his English counterpart. Broadly
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speaking, it is quite clear that American judges do not share the long years
of professional experience that English judges do, and that American appellate judges have not experienced the years of sitting at first instance that
nearly all English appellate judges have. On the other hand most American judges share a far more political background than do English judges.
Almost without exception American judges, on appointment, are known to
be adherents to, or at least supporters of, one of the major political parties;
with few exceptions, appointed judges in America come from the same
party as the appointing person. 47 The great majority of American judges
have held political office of some kind or other during their careers. 48 Furthermore, requirements of electoral confirmation are by no means always a
formality. Politics can enter significantly into this process; for example,
Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court was confirmed by
after a campaign in which she was
only 51.7% of the electorate in 1978
49
accused of being "soft on crime."
I am not merely suggesting that the background, qualifications, and experience of American judges differ widely from those of English judges.
Just as relevant is the fact that American judges also vary widely among
themselves with respect to those matters, while English judges share an
exceptionally uniform socializing background experience. The homogeneity of the English judiciary and the senior bar in terms of background and
values is of immense importance to the way in which questions of law are
decided in England. To the extent that judges share the same inarticulate
major premises, traditional legal reasoning is not nearly so bogus as American realism has been credited with demonstrating. When we bear in mind
all the other institutional factors that I have discussed, it seems to me manifest that the indeterminacy of rules in the English legal system is far less
acute than it is in the United States. English judges believe in rules more
than American judges do partly because rules do have a greater objective
validity in the English legal system.
It may well be that some American judges have a traditional perception
of the judicial role that does not differ significantly from that of most English judges. But even the most traditional minded American judge operates in a different milieu from English judges; the rules of law-the raw
material with which he works--differ from those with which English
judges work. These factors must be borne in mind because there must
inevitably be interaction between judicial perceptions of the judicial role
and the nature of the rules of the system. Even a very traditional American state supreme court judge, for example, may have to ask himself
whether he feels his court should stick rigidly to a prior decision when
most other state supreme courts have followed a different line. No English
judge ever has to face such a question.
Another question about which I need to say a little concerns the general
47. See D.

48. H.
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VINES,

supra note 10, at 48.

49. P. STOLZ, supra note 29, at 119.

99 (1976).
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levels of competence of the judges. Judges who lack adequate legal understanding, judges who fail to devote adequate attention to the evidence or
briefs (whether through laziness, inattention, or alcoholism), judges who
totally lack a judicial temperament and seem incapable of fairly investigating the issues or arguments in a case, judges whose background or ideology predisposes them to think that, for example, policemen always (or
never) give untrue testimony, and judges who suffer from other such failings well known to trial lawyers, necessarily have a bearing on the congruence between law in the books and actual decisions. In these respects, too,
it cannot be denied that there is a significant difference between the situation in England and that in the United States. While the best American
judges stand comparison with the best English judges in regard to integrity, competence, fairness, and acumen, it cannot be disputed that the
worst American judges are a great deal worse than the worst English
judges, nor can it be denied that there are more of them. Lawyers advising
clients have to take account of such matters, which therefore must be considered as additional factors, adding to the unpredictability of decisions
and the indeterminacy of the law.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

As I indicated earlier, there are no doubt many other differences in the
institutions of the two countries that contribute to produce these differing
levels of rule orientation. A full picture would need to take account not
only of courts and judges, but also of the legal profession, of legal education and the role of law reviews and textbooks, of the different traditions
regarding legislation, of the impact of federalism on a legal system and a
legal culture, and probably of many other factors as well.
When this exercise has been properly done, it will be time enough to
open up for discussion a number of more theoretical questions concerning
the nature of law, the relationship of law and morality, and so on. I do not
propose to begin looking at these questions now. But I will say this, that it
may be found in the end that differing protagonists in the seemingly endless jurisprudential debates may have had, and may still have, differing
perceptions of law because they have been brought up and worked in legal
systems with deep institutional differences. Perhaps the major differences
between, for example, the theories of Professor H.L.A. Hart and the late
Lon Fuller may turn out to be related to the fact that the former was an
Englishman and thought of law in terms of the English legal system, while
the latter was an American who thought in terms of the American legal
system.5 0 Theories of law may turn out to be more chauvinistic than the
theorists have ever suspected.

50. Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) with L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d rev. ed. 1969).

